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THE STATE CONSTITUTION'S CRUEL OR UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT CLAUSE: THE BASIS FOR FUTURE
DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE IN FLORIDA?
DONNA E. BLANTON
Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder,
forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and
unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden.'
I. INTRODUCTION
HE Florida Constitution's cruel or unusual punishment clause,
found in article I, section 17, historically has been ignored by the
Florida Supreme Court in capital cases.2 The court generally decides
capital cases on Eighth Amendment grounds, occasionally citing the
Florida constitutional provision, but rarely construing it differently or
distinguishing it from its federal counterpart.3 However, the supreme
court's lockstep approach to the Eighth Amendment provision and ar-
ticle I, section 17 may be changing. Three Florida Supreme Court
cases decided in 1991 and 1992 signal a new approach to state consti-
tutional jurisprudence that may lead to an independent interpretation
of article I, section 17.
The court in 1992 sent a clear message in Traylor v. State4 that it
intends to rely on the state constitution to protect individual liberties,
particularly in criminal cases. The case includes strong language about
federalism and the primacy of the Florida Constitution in the majority
opinion by Justice Shaw and in the separate opinions by Justices
1. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
2. David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: 1991 Survey of the State Bill of Rights,
16 NOVA L. REV. 167, 218-19 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Survey; David C. Hawkins, Florida Con-
stitutional Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV. 693, 803
(1990) [hereinafter Ten- Year Retrospective].
3. See, e.g., Raulerson v. State, 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978)
(holding that capital punishment is not per se violative of either the Eighth Amendment or article
I, § 17 with no separate discussion of the state constitutional provision). See also LeCroy v.
State, 533 So. 2d 750, 758 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that imposing the death
penalty on juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment and article I, § 17 and treating the federal
and state constitutional provisions as indistinguishable), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989); Ten-
Year Retrospective, supra note 2, at 803.
4. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
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Kogan and Barkett.5 Traylor deals specifically with constitutional pro-
visions relating to self-incrimination and the right to counsel, but the
court's message regarding the importance of the state constitution's
Declaration of Rights6 is not limited to those provisions and is instead
viewed as a broad statement about the importance of state constitu-
tional law.7
The court held in Tillman v. State that the requirement that the
death penalty be administered proportionately comes in part from the
state constitution's express prohibition against unusual punishment.'
The court noted that it is "unusual" to impose death based on facts
similar to those in cases where death was found to be improper.9 Ad-
ditionally, the court stated in a footnote that the use of "or" in the
phrase "cruel or unusual punishment" indicates that alternatives were
intended. 0 The footnote suggests, without explicitly stating, that
5. Justice Shaw's opinion states:
When called upon to decide matters of fundamental rights, Florida's state courts
are bound under federalist principles to give primacy to our state constitution and to
give independent legal import to every phrase and clause contained therein. We are
similarly bound under our Declaration of Rights to construe each provision freely in
order to achieve the primary goal of individual freedom and autonomy.
Id. at 962-63 (footnote omitted).
As did Justice Shaw in the majority opinion, Justice Kogan wrote at length about federalism
and encouraged both judges and lawyers to put increased emphasis on the Florida Constitution:
Clearly, state constitutional issues must be considered first whenever fundamental
rights are at stake. Far too often, both bench and bar fail even to consider the possi-
bility that some principle of the Florida Constitution may be dispositive of the issue.
This practice clearly is contrary to the two central policies upon which the doctrine of
primacy rests.
First, primacy promotes judicial economy. As is obvious to all, lawyers and courts
need address federal claims only if no violation is found under the Florida Constitu-
tion .... Second and most importantly, primacy gives the state Constitution the re-
spect and effect its framers manifestly intended it to have. The Florida Constitution is
not a nullity to be ignored. Its words are not meaningless. When the state constitution
creates a fundamental right, that right must be respected, even if no similar right is
recognized by the federal courts.
Id. at 982-83 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Barkett wrote: "I agree with the recital of the law on federalism. It is, of course,
axiomatic that Florida can interpret its constitution independently of the federal courts." Id. at
974 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. Article I of the Florida Constitution encompasses the Declaration of Rights.
7. Randolph Pendleton, Go Beyond U.S. To Protect Accused, Court Says, FLA. TIMES-
UNION, Jan. 20, 1992, at BI. The court in Traylor upheld the second-degree murder conviction
of John Edward Traylor for the fatal stabbing of a woman in Jacksonville in 1980. Pendleton
found it noteworthy that rather than disposing of the case in a short opinion, the court wrote at
length about the relationship between the federal and state constitutions and the protections the
state constitution provides the accused.
8. 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991).
9. Id.
10. Id. n.2.
STATE CONSTITUTION
"cruel or unusual" in the Florida Constitution is different from
"cruel and unusual" in the United States Constitution." Tillman rep-
resents the first time that the court has found independent meaning in
article I, section 17 in a capital case.
The third recent case that may be important in future state constitu-
tional jurisprudence is Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop-
erty, 2 a decision that provides a framework for resolving state due
process issues and elevates the protection of property rights under the
Florida Constitution.3 The court found in Real Property that the sub-
stantive due process component of article I, section 9 (the Florida
Constitution's due process clause) protects "the full panoply of indi-
vidual rights" from unjustified interference by the State. 4 This state-
ment suggests that personal rights declared throughout the
constitution give substantive content to the state due process clause."
In Real Property the court also specifically mentioned article I, sec-
tion 17, noting that Floridians have a substantive right to be free from
"excessive punishments."'16 Although Real Property is not a capital
case and does not deal with the cruel or unusual punishment clause, it
nonetheless illustrates the court's willingness to explore article I, sec-
tion 17 and to interpret it independently of the Eighth Amendment.
Much like Traylor, the Real Property decision signals the court's in-
tention to rely exclusively on the Florida Constitution to resolve an
array of constitutional issues. 7
This Comment interprets the signs that the Florida Supreme Court
intends to rely more frequently on the Florida Constitution in the con-
text of "New Federalism," the phrase most often used to describe the
trend of state courts to construe their own constitutional provisions
more broadly than the United States Supreme Court construes similar
federal provisions, particularly in the area of individual rights. This
Comment outlines the development of New Federalism; reviews
11. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIl.
12. 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).
13. The case dealt with the procedures used by the State to execute a property seizure and
forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. For a thorough discussion of Real
Property and its implications for various provisions of the Florida Constitution's Declaration of
Rights, see 1991 Survey, supra note 2. at 181.
14. 588 So. 2d at 960.
15. 1991 Survey, supra note 2, at 189-90.
16. 588 So. 2d at 964. The phrase comes from the title of article I, § 17, which has no
independent significance. The construction of a constitutional provision is determined by its text,
not its title. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(h). The discussion of "excessive punishments" in Real
Property results in a different approach to forfeiture than is found in Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence. See 1991 Survey, supra note 2, at 219.
17. See 1991 Survey, supra note 2, at 191.
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Florida's role in the movement; discusses other states' death penalty
cases that are based on state constitutional provisions; explores the
history and application of article I, section 17; and recommends that
the Florida Supreme Court use the prohibition against cruel or unu-
sual punishment to develop death penalty jurisprudence different
from that created by the United States Supreme Court.
II. NEW FEDERAUSM
Before the United States Constitution existed, most of the Ameri-
can colonies had constitutions containing specific fundamental rights
limiting the power of state governments. Drafters of the Bill of Rights
relied heavily on these state constitutions. The first ten amendments to
the United States Constitution, in fact, were intended as a simplified
version of similar state constitutional provisions, and their purpose
was to extend corresponding protections to the federal government.18
Further, framers of constitutions in states admitted to the Union after
the United States Constitution was adopted-such as Florida-used
other state constitutions, not the federal Constitution, as their mod-
els. 19
The amendments in the federal Bill of Rights were rarely invoked
until after the Civil War and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and even then, many more years passed before they were ap-
plied to state action.20 State constitutions thus served as the primary
protectors of individual liberties. The Warren Court in the 1960s dra-
matically changed federal constitutional law by extending to the states
most of the protections of the Bill of Rights. This "incorporation doc-
trine" deeply involved state courts in construing federal constitutional
law, but it overshadowed state constitutional interpretation.2' The
profound changes in the relationship between the state and federal
courts created by the incorporation doctrine resulted in such a de-em-
phasis of state constitutional interpretation that law schools offered
few classes in state constitutional law and casebooks rarely mentioned
state constitutions.22 Consequently, many lawyers today-trained to
18. Shirley Abrahamson, Reincarnation & Reawakening, HmN RIGHTS, Winter 1992, at
27; Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court of
CriminalAppeals?, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1481, 1485-86 (1990).
19. Abrahamson, supra note 18, at 27.
20. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489, 493 (1977).
21. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1147 (1985); Herasimchuk, supra note 18, at 1487-
89.
22. James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State
Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1299, 1312 n.74 (1989).
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think in terms of federal constitutional law-do not think of raising
state constitutional issues in their claims.23
In the 1970s and 1980s, as the Burger and Rehnquist Courts began
reducing protections provided by the Bill of Rights, some state court
judges began looking to their own constitutions.' Justice Brennan is
often credited with providing impetus to the New Federalism move-
ment by writing in 1977 that state courts should look to state constitu-
tions to protect individual liberties. 2 Brennan wrote: "[Sitate courts
cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections
of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of in-
dividual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those re-
quired by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law." 2 6
Influential state court judges, such as Hans Linde of Oregon and Shir-
ley S. Abrahamson of Wisconsin, also began touting the use of state
constitutions to expand protections. 7 Although the image of New
Federalism is that of a completely "liberal" movement, some studies
show that the adoption of Burger and Rehnquist Court doctrines by
state courts far exceeds their rejection. 8 The important point is that
state courts are increasingly looking to their own constitutions-rather
than to the federal Constitution-to develop their own jurisprudence,
be it "liberal" or "conservative." 29
23. Robin Sher, How To Fight for Civil Liberties, HumAN RIGHTS, Winter 1992, at 12 (not-
ing the lack of a vigorous and sustained effort by the practicing bar to promote and develop
state constitutional law). See also Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that both bench and bar often fail to consider the
possibility that some principle of the Florida Constitution may be dispositive of a particular
issue).
24. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1312-13; Brennan, supra note 20, at 495.
25. Brennan, supra note 20, at 491.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra notes 18 & 21; Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constiu-
tional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. Rav. 165, 178 (1984) ("My own view has long been
that a state court always is responsible for the law of its state before deciding whether the state
falls short of a national standard, so that no federal issue is properly reached when the state's
law protects the claimed right.").
28. Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution," 74 JUDicA-
uaRE 190 (1991) (a study of state court criminal justice rulings).
29. Numerous studies have shown the rise in state constitutional interpretation in the past
two decades. One survey shows that state supreme courts recognized rights under state constitu-
tions in only three cases from 1950-59, and in only seven cases from 1960-69. In the 1970s,
however, those courts recognized state constitutional rights in 124 cases, and they did so in 177
cases from 1980 to 1986.. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1312 n.74 (citing Ronald K.L. Collins
et. al., State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A
Judicial Survey, 13 HAsTIGos CoNsr. L.Q. 599, 600-01 & table 1 (1986)). Another study shows
that since 1970, state supreme courts have issued more than 450 opinions concluding that indivi-
duals have greater rights under the state constitution than under the federal Constitution. John
C. Cooper, Beyond the Federal Constitution: The Status of State Constitutional Law in Florida,
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A. How State Courts Insulate Their Decisions
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution0 prohibits
state courts from interpreting their constitutions less stringently than
the federal Constitution. However, as the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized, nothing prevents state courts from
granting greater protections than are provided by the federal Constitu-
tion. "  In Michigan v. Long,32 the Supreme Court spelled out the
guidelines that state courts must follow to insulate their decisions
from federal review. The case stands for the proposition that a state
court must make a "plain statement" that it is relying on adequate
and independent state law grounds in its decision. Otherwise, a pre-
sumption is created that federal law has been applied and federal
courts will consider the state court's decision as fair game for review. 3
The Long decision has been credited with increasing the trend toward
reliance on state constitutions in state court decisions.3
Although state constitutional provisions can be interpreted differ-
ently from those in the federal Constitution even when the provisions
are worded identically,3 textual differences often serve as a starting
point for an alternate interpretation. The difference in wording often
prompts research into the history of a state constitutional provision,
an exercise that sometimes uncovers drafters' intentions that are dif-
ferent from those of the federal Constitution's drafters.36 Perhaps
more importantly, the legitimacy of state courts premising decisions
on state constitutions is most apparent and least often questioned
when the wording of the provisions is different.37 A state court taking
a state constitutional provision that is phrased identically to a federal
provision and suddenly exchanging decades of jurisprudence by the
United States Supreme Court for its own interpretation almost assur-
18 STETSON L. REV. 241, 242-43 (1989) (citing Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The
Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 217 (1988)). Still another report
notes that state high courts have rendered more than 600 opinions since 1970 that go beyond the
federal Constitution on individual rights issues. Mary Hladky, Privacy Puts Florida on the Map,
MIA I REV., Feb. 26, 1990, at 5C.
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
31. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
32. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
33. I'd. at 1041-42.
34. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1311.
35. Linde, supra note 27, at 181-82 ("The first step is to overcome the sense that divergence
from Supreme Court doctrines is more legitimate when the state's text differs from its federal
counterpart than when they are the same. In truth, the state court is equally responsible for
reaching its own conclusion in either case.").
36. Linde, supra note 27, at 182-84.
37. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1320-21.
STATE CONSTITUTION
edly will be accused of judicial activism. Even Justice Brennan, writ-
ing in his famous law review article about the increased reliance on
state constitutions by state courts, indicated some surprise at such in-
terpretations when the state and federal provisions were identically
phrased, though he did not question the state courts' authority to dif-
fer with the federal interpretation. 8
In the context of constitutional provisions governing imposition of
the death penalty, fifteen of the thirty-six states that impose capital
punishment have provisions in their state constitutions virtually identi-
cal to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unu-
sual punishments." 39 Fourteen states, including Florida, prohibit cruel
''or" unusual punishments; five states prohibit "cruel" punishments;
and two states have no analogous provision. 40 Courts and scholars dis-
agree as to whether the differences in the wording of these provisions
are significant. 41
B. Florida's Role in the New Federalism
The Florida Supreme Court currently is perceived as a leader of the
New Federalism movement, largely because of recent decisions based
on the state constitution's privacy provision that Florida voters ap-
proved in 1980.42 In its annual review of the Florida Supreme Court,
the Miami Review wrote in 1990: "Striking the parental consent re-
quirement for abortions in last fall's T. W. gave Florida instant stand-
ing within The New Federalism, the movement to use state law to
expand civil rights. '4 3 The National Law Journal also took notice:
During the past several years, the Florida court has climbed aboard
the New Federalism bandwagon, deploying the state Constitution's
right-to-privacy clause to catapult civil rights far beyond federal
38. Brennan, supra note 20, at 495 ("[Miore and more state courts are construing state
constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their
states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.") (em-
phasis added).
39. Acker& Walsh, supra note 22, at 1321 n.112-15.
40. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1321 n. 112-15.
41. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1321-22 & n.116. Cases interpreting some of these
state constitutional provisions are discussed in Part III, infra.
42. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (holding that
Florida statute requiring parental consent for abortion of unmarried minor is unconstitutional
under provisions of article I, § 23 guaranteeing right to privacy). See also In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (holding that right to privacy protects decision of individual
in certain circumstances to forgo life-sustaining treatment).
43. Contents, MiAt REv., Feb. 26, 1990, at 3C (statement in the table of contents preview-
ing an article by Mary Hladky).
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constitutional limits. As a result, Florida has become the first
southern state to join activist courts like Oregon, California and New
Jersey as a guiding light for courts throughout the nation."
Although the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted other state con-
stitutional provisions differently from the federal Constitution, most
of those interpretations have not attracted the national attention of
the privacy rulings.45
The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida Consti-
tution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, 46 how-
ever, drew considerable attention in the 1980s. The Florida court,
drawing the ire of law enforcement officials and legislators who would
have preferred adherence to increasingly conservative United States
Supreme Court decisions, construed the state constitutional provision
as providing more protections than the Fourth Amendment .41 Conse-
quently, Florida courts now are limited when dealing with search and
seizure issues by a 1983 amendment to the state constitution that com-
mands adherence to the United States Supreme Court doctrine in the
Fourth Amendment area. The amendment, proposed by the Legisla-
ture and approved by voters in 1982, has been explained by some as a
reaction to a court that was too activist in its interpretation of the
44. Rosalind Resnick, This Court's a Backwater No More: The Florida Supreme Court Is
Expanding the Right of Privacy Beyond Federal Limits, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1990, at 1.
45. See generally Ten- Year Retrospective, supra note 2, at 702 (discussing interpretation of
the state constitution's Declaration of Rights); Cooper, supra note 29 (citing several examples of
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state constitutional provisions in a manner different
from federal constitutional provisions).
One example of the Florida Supreme Court's reliance on the Florida Constitution can be
found in State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984), which held that the right to trial by an
impartial jury requires retrial if the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to remove a pro-
spective juror solely on account of race. The Neil decision predates Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), which held that a prosecutor cannot use peremptory strikes in a racially discrimi-
natory manner. Nell, therefore, is a good example of a state court relying on its own constitution
to reach a conclusion that is later also reached by the United States Supreme Court under the
federal Constitution. Proponents of New Federalism argue that state court experimentation-the
"laboratories of democracy" function-is one of the key advantages of judicial reliance on state
constitutions. Abrahamson, supra note 18, at 29 ("New federalism serves as a reminder to state
courts that they should experiment with new approaches that, if successful, may later be applied
nationwide by the United States Supreme Court.").
46. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
47. For a summary of the cases construing article I, § 12, see Ten-Year Retrospective, supra
note 2, at 773-75. The most controversial case was State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla.
1981), in which the court held that the warrantless interception of a conversation in the defen-
dant's home by an undercover detective wearing a "body bug" violated the state constitutional
provision. Article I, § 12 is worded considerably differently from the Fourth Amendment. For
example, the text includes the exclusionary rule (" [a]rticles or information obtained in violation
of this right shall not be admissible in evidence"), which under the Fourth Amendment is found
only in case law.
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state constitution's search and seizure provision." Others have argued
that the amendment is ill-conceived and should be repealed because it
is contrary to state court independence.4 9 The strength of the 1983
amendment is demonstrated by a study of state court reliance on state
constitutions in the criminal justice area between the late 1960s and
1989.50 The study found that Florida was the fourth most active court
in the country before the 1983 amendment became effective." An
analysis of decisions following the effective date of the amendment
placed Florida as one of the least active courts.12
The Florida Supreme Court's recent opinions in Traylor v. State3
and Department of Law Enforcement v. Real PropertyS4 best illustrate
the court's current thinking about New Federalism. Both decisions
have drawn the attention of commentators who predict that the opi-
nions will serve as precedents for increased reliance on the state con-
stitution.5
• Traylor preserves the protections afforded by Miranda v. Arizona"
and its progeny under the Florida Constitution, which means that any
further retreat by the United States Supreme Court on the self-incrim-
ination and right-to-counsel issues covered by those opinions will not
apply in Florida.17 In Traylor's majority opinion, a lengthy
48. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 277 & n.220 (stating that the amendment served as a
classic illustration of participatory democracy in action).
49. Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of
Florida's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 653 (1987).
50. Latzer, supra note 28, at 192-93.
51. Latzer, supra note 28, at 192-93.
52. Latzer, supra note 28, at 192-93.
53. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
54. 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).
55. Pendleton, supra note 7. Writing about the Traylor decision, Pendleton noted: "By
calling for the Florida Constitution, rather than the U.S. Constitution, to prevail on these ques-
tions, the Florida Supreme Court set itself up as the final arbiter. . . . Whether that is good or
bad depends on one's point of view, but there is no denying it is an important development."
See also 1991 Survey, supra note 2, at 191. ("Real Property is a fountainhead of state constitu-
tional decision making. The decision illustrates the court's willingness to dispose of far-reaching
constitutional questions entirely on the strength of the Florida Constitution"). Both Traylor and
Real Property are discussed in Part I, supra.
56. 384U.S. 436 (1966).
57. The Traylor court stated:
Based on the foregoing analysis of our Florida law and the experience under Mir-
anda and its progeny, we hold that to ensure the voluntariness of confessions, the
Self-Incrimination Clause of Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution, requires that
prior to custodial interrogation in Florida suspects must be told that they have a right
to remain silent, that anything they say will be used against them in court, that they
have a right to a lawyer's help, and that if they cannot pay for a lawyer one will be
appointed to help them.
596 So. 2d at 965-66 (footnotes omitted). Traylor also established standards under article I, § 16
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discussion" of federalism and the Florida Constitution's Declaration
of Rights reads like a "how to" guide for relying on the state consti-
tution. Further, Justice Kogan's separate opinion in Traylor clearly
indicates that he wishes both lawyers and judges would look to the
Florida Constitution more frequently.19
The Real Property opinion relies exclusively on article I of the Flor-
ida Constitution and describes state substantive due process as a
broad concept that protects all individual rights from unwarranted
governmental encroachment.60 The Real Property decision, therefore,
could be relevant to a variety of claims based on the Declaration of
Rights.
Tillman v. State6' is much shorter and less explicit in its meaning
than either Traylor or Real Property, but it may indicate that the
court intends to shift its focus in at least some types of death penalty
cases from the Eighth Amendment to article I, section 17. Tillman
represents the first time the court has indicated that the "cruel or unu-
sual punishment" provision in article I, section 17 is different from
the Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" provision
and could be subject to different interpretation. The court's intima-
tion of this difference is relegated to a two-sentence footnote that fo-
cuses on the use of "or" rather than "and" in the phrase "cruel or
unusual punishment.' '62 The sole citation used to support a different
interpretation of the word "or" is to Cherry Lake Farms, Inc. v.
Love,6 13 a 1937 opinion discussing how the word "or" should be inter-
preted when construing a statute. The Cherry Lake case, cited without
elaboration, states that "or" generally is construed in the disjunctive
unless the intent of the Legislature requires that it be construed in the
conjunctive."
(counsel clause) of the state constitution regarding a person's ability to choose a manner of
representation against criminal charges. Id. at 966-68. The court found that the right to counsel
must apply at each crucial stage of the prosecution, defined as "any stage that may significantly
affect the outcome of the proceedings." Id. at 968. The court also held that the right of indigent
defendants to assistance of court-appointed counsel is protected by the Florida Constitution's
equal protection clause (article 1, § 2). Id. at 969-70.
58. 596 So. 2d at 961-64.
59. Id. at 982 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991).
61. 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991). Tillman is discussed in Part I, supra.
62. Id. at 169 n.2 ("The Florida Constitution prohibits 'cruel or unusual punishment.'...
The use of the word "or" indicates that alternatives were intended.") (emphasis added).
63. 176 So. 486 (Fla. 1937).
64. Id. at 488 ("Employed between two terms which describe different subjects of a power,
the word 'or' usually implies a discretion when it occurs in a directory provision, and a choice
between two alternatives when it occurs in a permissive provision.").
STATE CONSTITUTION
The Tillman case involved a man convicted of first-degree murder
in the stabbing death of a woman. As the result of a plea agreement,
the facts of the murder available for review by the Florida Supreme
Court stated only that the woman was discovered shortly after she was
stabbed fifty-nine times, that she later bled to death in the hospital,
and that Tillman was on parole for burglary at the time of the mur-
der.61 Because of the scant record available for review, the court could
not determine whether the murder was more like the multiple stabbing
murders in which defendants had received the death penalty or more
like those murders in which death was not considered a proportionate
penalty. 66 The point of focusing on cruel or unusual punishment in
Tillman was to find that it is "unusual" to impose death based on
facts similar to those in cases where death was not considered
proper.
6 7
III. OTHER STATES' DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE
A. Per Se Challenges
Just two state supreme courts, California" and Massachusetts, 69
have declared the death penalty invalid on state constitutional
grounds. Both decisions were quickly reversed by the voters through
constitutional amendments."" In People v. Anderson, the California
Supreme Court relied on the California Constitution's "cruel or unu-
sual" punishment clause, using the disjunctive "or" to distinguish the
state clause from the Eighth Amendment provision. 71 The court found
that the death penalty was both cruel" and unusual." Because Ander-
65. Tillman, 591 So. 2d at 168.
66. Id. at 169.
67. Id. The court conducts a "proportionality review" in death cases that involves a com-
parison of cases in which the death penalty was imposed. Justice Kogan, writing for the majority
in Tillman, stated that the requirement that death be administered proportionately has a variety
of sources in Florida law, including article 1, § 17 of the Florida Constitution. Justice Kogan also
cites the state constitution's due process clause (article I, § 9) as a source for the proportionality
requirement and notes that because death is a uniquely irrevocable penalty, a more intensive
level of judicial scrutiny is required. See also supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
68. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.), cert. denied sub nom. California v. Ander-
son, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
69. District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980).
70. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27; MAss. CONST. pt. i, an. 26.
71. 493 P.2d at 883-91.
72. Id. at 891-97. The court found that the death penalty was cruel on the basis of the total
impact of capital punishment, from the pronouncement of the judgment of death through the
execution itself, which it described as a "lingering death." The court cited the "dehumanizing
effects" of lengthy imprisonment during the appeal process.
73. Id. at 897-99. The court noted that few "civilized" nations impose capital punishment
and that the trend is toward abolition.
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son was decided while Furman v. Georgia74 was pending before the
United States Supreme Court, the California case was quickly over-
shadowed when the Court invalidated virtually all death sentences in
the country." In District Attorney v. Watson, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts found that the death penalty was unconstitu-
tionally cruel under the state constitution's prohibition against cruel
or unusual punishments, 76 but Massachusetts voters quickly disposed
of that decision with a constitutional amendment. 77
Individual justices in several states, including Indiana," Tennes-
see, 79 Utah, 0 Washington,"' and Wyoming 2 have argued that the
death penalty is per se violative of state constitutional provisions, but
their opinions have not prevailed. Numerous state courts, including
Florida in Raulerson v. State, have rejected per se challenges to the
death penalty on state constitutional grounds.3
74. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
75. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1305. For an interesting view of how the California
decision was viewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Boa WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 212 (1979) (Chief Justice Burger was upset because the California decision deprived
the Court of the most brutal of pending death penalty decisions, and he was concerned that the
decision gave weight to the argument that contemporary values were evolving toward abolition
of the death penalty.).
76. 411 N.E.2d at 1283-87. The court cited the "full panoply of concomitant physical and
mental tortures" in the operation of the death penalty. The court also found that the death
penalty was unconstitutional because it was applied arbitrarily.
77. MAss. CONST. Pt. I, art. 26 (amended 1982) (specifying that "No provision of the Con-
stitution, however, shall be construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of
death.").
78. Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425, 431-42 (Ind. 1971) (DeBruler, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (arguing that the death penalty violates the Indiana Constitution), rev'd in part on reh 'g
and death penalty vacated, 284 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 1972).
79. State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132-42 (Tenn.) (Brock, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
the death penalty violates the Tennessee Constitution provision against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
80. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1357-59 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (arguing that the death penalty violates substantive due process rights), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 882 (1978).
81. State v. Rupe, 683 P.2d 571, 598-99 (Wash. 1984) (Dolliver, J., concurring) (arguing
that death penalty constitutes cruel punishment and therefore violates the Washington Constitu-
tion).
82. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 199-216 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
that the death penalty violates Wyoming Constitution's provision against cruel or unusual pun-
ishment), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
83. Raulerson v. State, 358 So. 2d 826, 828-29 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978). See
Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1331-32 n.151 for a list of state court decisions rejecting
arguments that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. The authors note that most of
these decisions include little, if any, discussion of the state constitutional provision on which
they rely. Because the decisions do not include reasoned analysis or consideration of specific
state historical or attitudinal factors, the authors argue that they could be overturned by a com-
prehensive, well-reasoned state constitutional challenge to capital punishment. Acker & Walsh,
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Given the reaction to the California and Massachusetts decisions by
voters, some state judges probably recognize that a per se declaration
that the death penalty violates the state constitution is politically im-
possible, even though such a decision is legally supportable. The 1986
retention election in California rejecting Supreme Court Chief Justice
Rose Bird and two of her colleagues-partly because of their voting
records in death penalty cases84-no doubt bolsters such a belief.
A more serious concern about per se challenges to the death penalty
relates to the integrity of the court rather than the political fortunes of
individual justices. What does it say about a state court's credibility
when it declares that the death penalty no longer comports with mod-
ern standards of decency"5 and the electorate responds by promptly
declaring the court to be wrong?as One state court judge, Justice Shir-
ley S. Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, insists that
elected state judges will resist public opinion, if necessary, in constitu-
tional interpretation.17 "Judges are not to rule on the basis of the pas-
sions of the times. Judges must interpret the law exercising integrity,
intellect, and wisdom-even in the face of community hostility,"
Abrahamson wrote in 1985.88 In an ideal society, Justice Abrahamson
is correct. Justice Brennan, however, probably is more accurate when
he notes: "It cannot be denied that state court judges are often more
immediately 'subject to majoritarian pressures than federal courts,
and are correspondingly less independent than their federal counter-
parts."' 89
supra note 22, at 1321-22 n.151. The Florida decision makes the authors' point: Raulerson in-
cludes no discussion of article I, § 17 or any other Florida constitutional provision (the death
penalty was challenged on federal constitutional grounds as well as on grounds that it violated
article I, §§ 2 (basic rights), 9 (due process), and 17 (excessive punishments)), Raulerson, 358 So.
2d at 828-29.
84. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1330 n. 145 (Before the election, the California Su-
preme Court had vacated death sentences in all but three of the 56 capital cases it had decided.).
85. "Evolving standards of decency" are relevant in all decisions concerning imposition of
the death penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly cited a statement from Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." In Penry v. Ly-
naugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-35 (1989), for example, the Court noted the relevancy of evolving
standards of decency, but suggested that the two state statutes prohibiting the execution of the
mentally retarded did not provide sufficient evidence that decency had evolved enough to justify
finding such executions unconstitutional.
86. Linde, supra note 27, at 192.
87. Abrahamson, supra note 21, at 1155.
88. Abrahamson, supra note 21, at 1155.
89. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Consti-
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 551 (quoting Note, Michigan
v. Long: Presumptive Federal Appellate Review over State Cases Containing Ambiguous
Grounds of Decision, 69 IOWA L. RE'V. 1081, 1096-97 (1984)).
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The Florida Supreme Court is unlikely to declare the death penalty
unconstitutional per se based on article I, section 17. Even if a major-
ity of the court was inclined to do so, which is unlikely, such a deci-
sion would necessarily involve overruling Raulerson v. State,90 a case
holding that capital punishment is not per se violative of either the
Eighth Amendment or article I, section 17. Additionally, the court al-
ready has experienced one constitutional amendment designed to limit
its ability to interpret the state constitution;9' a decision as controver-
sial as declaring the death penalty unconstitutional would likely spark
another. 92 The court could, however, use the state constitution's cruel
or unusual punishment clause to develop its own approach to a variety
of capital punishment issues, including the execution of the mentally
retarded and juveniles. Several such "as applied" challenges to the
death penalty in other states are discussed in the following subsection.
Areas of the law this author considers particularly appropriate for
death penalty jurisprudence based on the Florida Constitution are dis-
cussed in Part IV.
B. "As Applied" Challenges
A variety of "as applied" challenges to the death penalty may be
viable because of general dissatisfaction with the United States Su-
preme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. 93 A specific point of frus-
tration is the tension between the requirement for consistency in
sentencing schemes" and the requirement of individualized sentenc-
ing.95 Even if state courts find the logic of United States Supreme
90. 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
91. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
92. Prosecutors miss few opportunities to grumble about the Florida Supreme Court. In
January 1990, Attorney General Bob Butterworth blasted the court's decisions in three search
and seizure cases in a speech to the Florida Sheriff's Association and urged citizens to consider
constitutional amendments that would further confine the court to following federal precedent:
"A pattern appears to be developing, a pattern that should be discouraging to every law-abiding
Floridian .... During the past two or three years, the Florida Supreme Court has begun to show
itself substantially more liberal on crime issues than the U.S. Supreme Court." Hladky, supra
note 29, at 7C. After the decision in Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992) (mandating
Miranda-type protections based on the state constitution), Deputy Attorney General Peter An-
tonacci was quoted as saying: "The message that our court is sending out is treat these criminals
gingerly-be nice to them." Pendleton, supra note 7, at B2.
93. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1338-45 (discussing the development of U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence in the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
94. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
95. See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). For an example of one state judge's
frustration, see State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 302 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting) ("Be-
cause I believe that the federal decisional law has lost coherence and pursues fundamentally
contradictory-perhaps unattainable-goals, I have no confidence in federal precedent as a
guide in interpreting [the New Jersey] Constitution.").
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Court decisions generally persuasive, they may depart from that logic
and base a decision on state constitutional grounds if the evidence in
an "as applied" challenge is sufficiently persuasive.9 Additionally,
state courts that generally adhere to Eighth Amendment capital pun-
ishment doctrine may choose to rely on their state constitutions when
certain issues arise. 97
For example, in State v. Smith,9 a plurality of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that the open courts provision of the Louisiana
Constitution requires review of all possible errors in a death penalty
case, even if the errors are not properly raised by the defendant. The
United States Supreme Court, in the context of federal habeas corpus
review, has taken a much more stringent view of procedural errors. 99
The Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned:
In a case involving capital punishment anything less than this court's
careful consideration of the entire record for possible prejudicial
error would not afford "an adequate remedy by due process of law
and justice." Further, this court's refusal to consider such an error,
simply because appellant's lawyer did not properly raise it, as more
able counsel might have, would either defer the problem, adding to
the burgeoning delays of postconviction proceedings in state and
federal courts, or create the risk of allowing appellant to be executed
without a judicial determination of whether the error had
prejudicially affected the procedural fairness or accuracy of
factfinding in his case.10
The Georgia Supreme Court in 1989 relied on its state constitution
in Fleming v. Zant'0 to find that execution of the mentally retarded
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The court, relying primar-
ily on a prospective legislative enactment that was passed after the
Fleming defendant's trial, found a state consensus against execution
96. Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1339.
97. An array of possible "as applied" challenges is discussed in Acker & Walsh, supra note
22, at 1337-45, Among the suggested issues state courts may want to explore are the procedures
that ought to be required for administration of the death penalty to avoid arbitrariness and
regulation of prosecutorial decision making in capital cases.
98. 554 So. 2d 676 (La. 1989).
99. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (petitioners seeking federal habeas relief on
constitutional claims defaulted in state court must show reason why the claim was not raised and
that failure to raise the claim resulted in prejudice). See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986) (existence of cause for a procedural default must turn on whether the prisoner can show
that an objective factor external to the defense harmed counsel's efforts to comply with the state
procedural rule).
100. 554 So. 2d at 678 (quoting LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22) (citation omitted).
101. 386 SE.2d 339 (Ga. 1989).
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of the mentally retarded. 02 The Fleming case was decided just a few
months after Penry v. Lynaugh,103 a United States Supreme Court
case holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit execution
of the mentally retarded. Noting that the Penry Court discussed evolv-
ing standards of decency, the Georgia Supreme Court stated in Flem-
ing that the standards of the citizens of Georgia, not those of the rest
of the country, should be considered in deciding the case.'°4 The ma-
jority opinion in Fleming was sharply criticized in a dissent arguing
that the Georgia Legislature intended its prohibition against execution
of the mentally retarded to be prospective only. 105 The Fleming dissent
also charged that the legislation was passed "in an emotional response
to the execution of a mildly retarded defendant" and that the court,
by relying on the state constitution, had prohibited the Legislature
from amending the statute at a calmer moment. 106
State courts also can use proportionality grounds to limit the range
of offenses or the class of offenders that may be subject to capital
punishment.1 0° Under the federal Constitution, proportionality princi-
ples prohibit imposing the death penalty for certain offenses, such as
rape," 8 kidnapping, 1°9 and felony murder in some situations."20 Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty generally
may not be imposed on fifteen-year-olds,"' although the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit execution of sixteen- or seventeen-year-
olds."12
In Tillman v. State,' the Florida Supreme Court stated that Flori-
da's proportionality requirement is mandated, at least in part, by arti-
cle I, section 17. The court therefore could use the cruel or unusual
punishment clause's proportionality requirement-perhaps in con-
junction with the Florida Constitution's due process clause," 4 also
102. Id. at 342.
103. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
104. 386 S.E.2d at 341-42. The court wrote: "Federal constitutional standards represent the
minimum, not the maximum, protection that this state must afford its citizens. Thus, although
the rest of the nation might not agree, under the Georgia Constitution, the execution of the
mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 342 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 343 (Smith, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 345.
107. See Acker & Walsh, supra note 22, at 1354-56.
108. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
109. Eberhart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977).
110. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
111. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
112. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
113. 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991).
114. See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991) (dis-
cussing the Florida Constitution's due process requirements). Real Property is discussed in Parts
I and IIB, supra.
STATE CONSTITUTION
identified in Tiliman as a source for proportionality-to find that exe-
cution of certain classes of defendants violates proportionality princi-
ples.
IV. HISTORY OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 17 AND ITS USE IN DEATH CASES
A. The Language of Section 17
The Florida Constitution's prohibition against cruel "or" unusual
punishment has been part of every Florida Constitution since 1838."1
Minutes of the first constitutional convention in 1838 and 1839 do not
indicate why the framers chose those particular words, nor does a
written account of the convention discuss the phrase."16 The phrase
has changed in subsequent constitutions only in that "punishment" is
singular in the constitutions of 1885, 1861, and 1868, and it is plural
in the constitutions of 1838 and 1865.1 7
Drafters of the first Florida Constitution used the constitutions of
other southern frontier states, particularly Alabama, as models. 118
While there is no evidence that the framers discussed what they meant
by the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, it is unlikely
that they intended to prohibit the death penalty. Florida's territorial
government at the time had passed statutes providing the death pen-
alty for certain crimes." 9 Among the crimes punishable by death was
the concealing on shipboard and carrying away of a slave owned by a
Floridian. 2 0
By the time of the 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution of 1885,
some drafters of the revision thought that standards of decency had
evolved sufficiently to outlaw the death penalty in the state constitu-
tion. Tallahassee lawyer Joseph C. Jacobs, a member of the Constitu-
115. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1838); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1861); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12
(1865); FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 6 (1868); FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 8
(1885). The current constitution is a revision of the 1885 constitution and was approved by vot-
ers in 1968. The cruel or unusual punishment clause was placed in article I, § 17 at the time of
that revision.
116. CHARLTON W. TEBEAU, A HISTORY OF FLORIDA 126-31 (1971) (discussing the convention
that met from December 3, 1838, until January 4. 1839). Minutes of the constitutional conven-
tion are on file at the Florida Department of State, Division of Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.
117. See generally FLA. STAT. Volume III, Helpful and Useful Matters (1941) (all of Flori-
da's constitutions printed in full).
118. TEBEAU, supra note 116, at 126. The author notes that "[c]onstitution making was actu-
ally a rather simple process." The framers did not depart significantly from the constitutions of
other southern states except on the issue of banking. Id. Florida was admitted to the Union in
1845.
119. TEBAu, supra note 116, at 129.
120. TEBAU, supra note 116, at 129.
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tion Revision Commission, proposed an amendment at a commission
meeting in 1966 to include in the constitution a prohibition against the
death penalty.12 1 Jacobs, in arguing for his amendment, cited a poll
showing that most citizens opposed capital punishment and stated his
belief that future generations would view the commission's vote
against his amendment as ridiculous. ,22 He stated:
Well, now, I'm not going to strip to the waist, and I'm not going
to thrash my breast, and I'm not going to talk about what the
legislature ought to do by statute. I'm simply going to say that I, and
I think a bunch of people in this room, do not believe that capital
punishment has any place in our society at this time. And this is one
opportunity that I have to say so, and I am saying so, and will say so
at every opportunity that I have. Now, to say that this has no place
in the declaration of basic rights that are guaranteed to all people in
Florida, and to say that they have got the right to trial by jury, got
the right to religious freedom, they have the right to habeas corpus,
they have protection against excessive fines, they have protection
against cruel and unhuman punishment, et cetera, they have the right
of bail, due process, equal protection and so forth, and to say at the
same time the State of Florida can legally take a life, is absolutely
foreign to what I think the constitution today should state.,"
Jacobs' proposed amendment failed. 1 24
The Florida Supreme Court assumed in Tillman v. State"5 that the
use of the disjunctive in the phrase cruel or unusual punishment was
intentional.126 Given the lack of information regarding the mindset of
the drafters of the Florida Constitution, Florida courts probably can-
not point to specific reasons why "cruel or unusual" was chosen.
Clearly, the drafters had several different phrases from which to
choose. The Alabama Constitution, which drafters of the Florida
Constitution reportedly relied on most heavily,2 7 prohibited "cruel
punishments."1 28 Some model constitutions that the drafters may have
looked to prohibited cruel or unusual punishments, some prohibited
121. Constitution Revision Commission Records, Vol. 7 Declaration of Rights, Amendment
No. 81 (Dec. 5, 1966) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 722, carton 2,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991). Tillman is discussed in Parts I and 1iB, supra.
126. See Cherry Lake Farms, Inc. v. Love, 176 So. 486 (Fla. 1937) (use of the word "or"
indicates a choice between two alternatives).
127. TE EAU, supra note 116, at 126.
128. ALA. CON ST. art. 1, § 16 (1819).
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cruel and unusual punishments, and still others had provisions requir-
ing that punishment be proportioned to the offense. 2 9 Florida courts
should assume that the drafters intentionally selected the particular
phrase "cruel or unusual" from several possible models and that they
intended the word "or" to be given its ordinary, disjunctive mean-
ing.130
B. The Application of Section 17
With the recent exception of Tillman,"3 ' the Florida Supreme Court
has given little indication that article I, section 17 should be inter-
preted independently from the Eighth Amendment.'3 2 Few cases have
addressed the nature of Florida's constitutional protection against
cruel or unusual punishment and, except for Tillman, none has sug-
gested that the section creates protections in capital punishment cases
that may be different from those derived from federal constitutional
law. As noted earlier, the Florida Supreme Court held in Raulerson v.
State"'33 that capital punishment is not per se violative of either the
Eighth Amendment or article I, section 17; the court, however, did
not separately discuss the state constitutional provision in that opin-
ion.
In LeCroy v. State,3 4 Justice Barkett argued in dissent that impos-
ing the death penalty on someone who was a juvenile at the time of
the crime violates both the Eighth Amendment and article I, section
17.' 3 She asserted her belief that capital punishment is "totally inap-
propriate when applied to persons who, because of their youth, have
not fully developed the ability to judge or consider the consequences
of their behavior. This conclusion particularly is strong in light of the
legal disabilities imposed upon minors because of their lack of mature
judgment."' 3 6 Justice Barkett also stated her belief that most reasona-
ble people would agree that the death penalty should not be imposed
on children below a certain age.'" She suggested that the line should
129. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 883-886 (Cal. 1972) (discussion of several early
state constitutions and whether they prohibited cruel or unusual punishment, cruel punishmeni,
cruel and unusual punishment, or other variations), cert. denied sub. nom. California v. Ander-
son, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
130. See id. at 886 (California Supreme Court refused to presume that framers of the Cali-
fornia Constitution chose the disjunctive form haphazardly).
131. 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991).
132. 1991 Survey, supra note 2, at 218-29; Ten- Year Retrospective, supra note 2, at 803.
133. 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
134. 533 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).
135. Id. at 758-60 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 758.
137. Id. at 759.
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be drawn at the age of majority. Justice Barkett did not discuss the
requirements of article I, section 17 as separate from those of the
Eighth Amendment.
The majority in LeCroy held that there is no constitutional bar to
imposing the death penalty on a defendant who was seventeen at the
time of the crime, but emphasized that it did not consider the case to
be a definitive resolution of whether there is a minimum age below
which the death penalty may not be imposed. 38 Instead, the decision
was limited to the facts of that case, which involved a seventeen-year-
old youth who was convicted in the shooting death of a husband and
wife while they were on a camping trip in Palm Beach County. 139
The Florida Supreme Court has not determined whether execution
of the mentally retarded is cruel or unusual punishment.'40 Three dis-
senting judges in Woods v. State, however, indicated their belief that
imposing the death penalty in such situations violates article I, section
17.' 4' In Woods, Justices Shaw and Barkett dissented from a decision
upholding the death penalty in a case involving an eighteen-year-old
man with a mental age of twelve and an IQ of between sixty and sixty-
nine. 4 The majority did not address the constitutional issue of exe-
cuting the mentally retarded because it had not been raised on direct
appeal. 43 In Woods, which was decided before Penry,'44 Justice Bar-
kett noted her belief that imposing the death penalty on a mentally
retarded person constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under both
the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17.145 Neither her dissent
nor Justice Shaw's discussed the requirements of article 1, section 17
or distinguished them in any way from those of the Eighth Amend-
ment.
The issues of executing juveniles and the mentally retarded are par-
ticularly appropriate for exploration using article I, section 17. Be-
cause the court has not decided whether execution of the mentally
retarded constitutes cruel or unusual punishment and because the
court has left open the question of whether there is a minimum age
below which the death penalty should not be imposed, the justices are
138. 533 So. 2d at 758.
139. Id.
140. See generally David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1991,
at 13; V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty:
A Comment on Florida's Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457 (1991).
141. Woods v. State, 531 So. 2d 79, 83-84 (Fla. 1989) (Shaw, J., dissenting) & (Barkett, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kogan joined both dissents.
142. Id.
143. 531 So. 2d at 82.
144. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
145. 531 So. 2d at 84 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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not constrained by precedent. Additionally, both issues present oppor-
tunities to discuss the meaning of "cruel" and the meaning of "unu-
sual" in the Florida Constitution.
In Tillman,'16 the court began to explore the meaning of "unusual"
in the context of proportionality review. That discussion logically
could continue with an analysis of whether execution of juveniles and
of mentally retarded persons is proportional. In other words, the
court could consider-using article I, section 17-whether execution
of juveniles and the mentally retarded is a proper punishment given
the "unusual" characteristics of the defendants. The dissents of
Justices Barkett and Shaw in Woods 47 and Justice Barkett in Le-
Croy148 begin the discussions of the particular characteristics of juven-
iles and mentally retarded persons that should be considered in such a
review.
Some guidance for defining the meaning of "cruel" in article I, sec-
tion 17 can be found in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fur-
man v. Georgia.149 One of the principles that Justice Brennan found
inherent in the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments
clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive; a punishment
is excessive when it is unnecessary. 5 0 He wrote:
The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport
with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless
infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe
punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the
punishment is inflicted . . . the punishment inflicted is unnecessary
and therefore excessive. '"'
The execution of juveniles and of the mentally retarded is arguably
unnecessary. The court should consider what goals are served by exe-
cuting an individual with an IQ of sixty.5 2 Other mentally impaired
individuals unlikely would be deterred by the execution from commit-
ting similar crimes. Is retribution a legitimate goal when the individual
who committed the crime has the mental ability of a twelve-year-old?
146. Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991).
147. 531 So. 2d 79, 83 (Fla. 1988) (Shaw, J., dissenting) & (Barkett, J., dissenting).
148. LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 758 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 925 (1989).
149. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972).
150. Id. at 279.
151. Id. (citations omitted).
152. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and numerous other cases, the Supreme Court
noted that imposition of the death penalty serves two legitimate goals: deterrence and retribu-
tion.
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Surely society would consider the execution of a twelve-year-old to be
"cruel." The goals of deterrence and retribution could be adequately
served by ensuring that the mentally retarded individual no longer has
unfettered contact with society. Similarly, what goals are served by
executing youths who have not yet developed the ability to grasp the
consequences of their behavior? Other immature youths are unlikely
to be deterred by the execution, and retribution is not likely to be
justified when the person executed could not fully appreciate the con-
sequences of his or her actions. Could not the goals of the punishment
be better served by ensuring that these juveniles have no further con-
tact with society? Juveniles and the mentally retarded, for reasons of
their immaturity or their low mental development, simply do not have
the same degree of culpability as do some other criminal defendants.
Executing them, therefore, is cruel because it is unnecessary.
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court should use article I, section 17 to de-
velop death penalty jurisprudence independent of the Eighth Amend-
ment. The Tillman case begins the process by noting that cruel "or"
unusual punishment is different from cruel "and" unusual punish-
ment. While a textual difference is not necessary in order for the court
to base decisions solely on the state constitutional provision, the dif-
ference in wording lends legitimacy to the court's independent review.
The court need not declare that the state constitutional provision cate-
gorically prohibits the death penalty; such a ruling would be extremely
controversial and could lead to a constitutional amendment. Instead,
the court should focus on areas of death penalty law that the court
has not yet fully developed, such as execution of juveniles and of the
mentally retarded.
The court in Tillman found that the requirement for proportionality
review is found in article I, section 17 and in article I, section 9. The
court, then, could use the cruel or unusual punishment clause in con-
junction with the due process provision to find that execution of the
mentally retarded and of people below a certain age constitutes "unu-
sual" punishment. Additionally, the court could rely on article I, sec-
tion 17 to find that executing juveniles and the mentally retarded
constitutes "cruel" punishment because the death penalty is unneces-
sary given the lessened culpability of defendants in those classes.
The Florida Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to
the primacy of the Florida Constitution in Traylor and found in Real
Property that the state constitution's due process clause protects all
individual rights from governmental encroachment. Those decisions
strongly indicate the court's intention to focus more frequently on the
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Florida Constitution, and they should provide support for arguments
based on state constitutional grounds in a variety of areas, including
article I, section 17.

